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We address a vital topic about labour markets in developing countries: 
The flexibility of the formal and informal labour sectors. For the 
Mexican economy, we use a panel from the National Survey of Urban 
Employment (ENEU) from 1995 to 2001. We control for workers’ ob-
servable characteristics, sample selection and non observable regional 
heterogeneity. We also take into account the possible endogeneity of 
the unemployment rate. The results show evidence that in the formal 
sector, unemployment does not affect wages. On the contrary, we found 
a clear negative effect of unemployment on wages in the informal 
sector. We also found evidence of a positive relation between formal-
informal wage differential and unemployment. These results suggest 
that the informal sector is more flexible than the formal sector.
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Resumen
En este trabajo estudiamos un tema de vital importancia para los mer-
cados laborales en países en desarrollo: La flexibilidad laboral en el 
sector formal e informal de la economía. Para el caso de la economía 
mexicana, usamos datos tipo panel de la Encuesta Nacional de Em-
pleo Urbano (ENEU) de 1995 a 2001. Controlamos por características 
observables de los trabajadores y heterogeneidad no observada entre 
regiones. También consideramos la posible endogeneidad de la tasa 
de desempleo. Los resultados muestran evidencia de que en el sector 
formal, la tasa de desempleo no afecta los salarios. Por el contrario, 
encontramos un fuerte efecto negativo de la tasa de desempleo sobre 
los salarios del sector informal. También encontramos evidencia de una 
relación positiva entre diferenciales salariales entre el sector formal 
y el informal y la tasa de desempleo. Estos resultados sugieren que 
el sector informal es más flexible que el sector formal en el mercado 
laboral mexicano.
Palabras clave: sector informal, flexibilidad laboral, selección mues-
tral, endogeneidad.
Clasificación JEL: J60, O17.
 
Introduction
In this study, we address a vital topic about labour markets in devel-
oping countries: The flexibility of the formal and informal labour 
sectors.
In a flexible labour market1, wages react downwards quickly after a 
shock in the demand for labour. Since wages are an important com-
1  There are two types of flexibility: flexibility in employment (external flexibility) and 
flexibility in work (internal flexibility). In this paper we deal with external flexibility: in 




ponent of the inflationary process, a swift reaction in wages during an 
economic crisis will have two positive effects on the economy: first, 
the inflationary pressure will be reduced, and, second, the impact of 
the shock on unemployment will be lower.
Generally, researchers and the government use information about wages 
in the formal economy. Given that nearly 40% of the Mexican labour 
force is informal2 (Mexican Survey of Urban Employment (ENEU)), it 
is crucial to include and understand this sector, in order to understand 
the dynamics of the labour markets in developing countries.
In this paper, we empirically investigate differences in flexibility be-
tween the formal and the informal market. We expect to find that the 
informal labour market is more flexible than the formal one. As the 
following section will show, there is more than one possible theoretical 
explanation for this fact. The most traditional one is that regulatory 
mechanisms imposed by a legal framework create restrictions on firing, 
hiring and promoting workers, and hence adversely affect flexibility 
in the formal labour market; whereas the absence of such regulatory 
and legal restrictions would promote the informal market’s flexibility. 
The labour literature suggests alternative explanations of differentiated 
labour market flexibilities. The efficiency wages literature explains 
differentials in flexibility between the two sectors by assuming dif-
ferent observability of the workers’ effort. Job-search theory can also 
elucidate differentials in flexibility by reference to differentials in 
information between the two sectors.
There are many ways to measure labour market flexibility. In the labour 
literature, there are three types of wage flexibility: relative wage flex-
ibility allows a smooth transfer of labour out of contracting industries 
through flexibility in employment. This is achieved through a combination of adjustments 
in wages, and in the demand and supply of labour. Flexibility is characterized by the rapid 
relocation of labour between industries, occupations or regions, and it ensures that any 
disturbance to the labour market is short-lived.
2  In the case of employees, informal workers are those who do not have either of the follow-
ing benefits: Social Security (IMSS), Public Social Security (ISSSTE), Pensions (AFORE), 
private health care (provided by the employer) or registration to the National Institute of 
House Founding (INFONAVIT). In the case of the self employed, workers not registered 
with a local or federal government or in commercial association are considered to be in-
formal.118
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or regions and into expanding ones; real wage flexibility determines 
the overall balance of supply and demand in the labour market; and 
finally, nominal wage rigidities reflect the difficulties of downward 
nominal wage flexibility. Unlike traditional studies of labour market 
flexibility, this analysis includes differences in labour flexibilities 
across regions and uses real wage series, therefore it is related to real 
and relative wage rigidities.
We analyze how wages react to changes in unemployment in the formal 
and in the informal sector. We also estimate how unemployment affects 
formal-informal wage differentials. If wage differentials are consid-
ered as a form of labour market distortion3, quantifying the effect of 
unemployment on wage differentials can shed light on the magnitude 
of the problem the Mexican labour market is facing.
We sequentially try different specifications in order to test the robustness 
of the results. We start using raw wages, we then use wages estimated by 
controlling for observable characteristics, sample selection and, finally, 
we also control for endogeneity of the unemployment rate.
We found that, if the unemployment rate increases by 10%, informal 
wages decrease by 27%. On the other hand, we have not found a sta-
tistical effect of unemployment on formal wages. This could be seen as 
evidence that the informal labour market is more flexible that the formal 
one. Regarding wage differentials, we found that if unemployment 
increases by 10%, formal-informal wage differentials increase by 24%. 
It is important to underline that these wage differentials are estimated 
after controlling for a wide range of workers’ observable characteristics, 
sample selection and unobserved regional heterogeneity. Therefore, 
wage differentials may be considered as an indicator of labour market 
efficiency. In this context, we show evidence that during an economic 
crisis i.e. volatile unemployment, like the one Latin American countries 
3  Several studies on informal labour market have estimated formal-informal labour wage dif-
ferentials (Alcaraz, Chiquiar and Ramos Francia, 2008; Perry, Maloney, Arias, Fajnzylber, 
Mason and Saavedra 2007; Maloney, 1999; Gong and Van Soest, 2002 among others). The 
majority of these papers found that, after controlling for diverse workers’ characteristics, 
formal workers’ wages are higher than those of informal workers. However, Maloney (1999) 
and Maloney (2004) argue that informal workers may be willing to receive lower wages 
due to non-pecuniary advantages of being employed in the informal sector, e.g. flexible 




are facing since the end of 2008, the efficiency of labour markets di-
minishes further making more difficult for the economy to adapt to the 
new circumstances and delaying the recovery process.
We could not find any reference in the consulted literature regarding 
the relationship between wages in the formal and informal sectors and 
unemployment. However Neri (2002), on his results for the informal 
sector in Brazil, estimated wage curves for formal and informal workers 
separately. He found that the elasticity of formal wages with respect to 
unemployment is negative and lower in absolute value than the elas-
ticity of the informal workers wage. This finding goes in line to what 
we have found: that wages of informal workers are more sensitive to 
changes in unemployment than formal workers’ wages.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section I, we review theo-
retical approaches that can explain the behavior of different sectors 
in a single labour market. In Section II, we review the definition of 
the informal labour market. Section III describes the methodology, 
while Section IV shows wage estimations. Section V presents the 
first results, and Section VI shows estimations that control for the 
endogeneity of the unemployment rate. Finally, Section VII contains 
concluding remarks.
I.  Theoretical Background
Given the characteristics of the informal labour market, we expect to 
find that the informal labour market is more flexible than the formal 
one. There are different ways to explain this phenomenon.
The lack of regulations in the informal sector is the most obvious way 
to explain its flexibility. In Mexico, the salaried work regulated by the 
Federal Law of Labour, which tries to promote safe work conditions, 
regulates labour contracts, minimum wages, employee benefits and 
union activity. For instance, Article 23 of the Federal Law of Labor 
(LFT4) establishes that workers who have worked in a firm for more 
than one year are entitled to receive a dismissal pay equal to three 
4  Spanish acronym.120
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month wages if fired. Since the informal sector does not comply with 
the LFT, the complete absence of a labour legal framework simplifies 
firing workers. The process of hiring a worker is also easier in the in-
formal sector, since they avoid to comply with the set of bureaucratic 
requirements normally needed in the formal sector, such as registering 
the worker with Social Security and the Ministry of Finance.
The absence of union activity in the informal sector is also an important 
factor in its flexibility. The process of hiring a worker is usually even 
more difficult if a firm has an unionized work force, because unions 
place important restrictions on the entrance of new workers. Addition-
ally, it is also more difficult to fire an unionized worker, and the union 
acts as a strong pressure group when negotiating new wage rates.
Besides this more traditional explanation, which emphasizes differ-
ences in regulatory rigidities, there are other ways of explaining the 
differences in wage flexibility between formal and informal labour 
market. In fact, these differences can be explained without the assump-
tion that regulations affect both sectors differently.
Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani (1989) link effort observability with 
informality in a theoretical model, using efficiency wages theory. Ac-
cording to the authors, the main characteristics of the informal sector 
(small firm sizes, low skilled workers and low technological level) are 
associated with higher levels of effort observability and more com-
petitive wages, which imply no involuntary unemployment and more 
flexibility. In contrast, in the formal sector with lower levels of effort 
observability, wages are usually above the reservation wage level, and 
this promotes involuntary unemployment and less labour flexibility.
Regarding job search, theoretical models of job search generally 
contain only one parameter capturing all possible factors affecting the 
efficiency of search. However, Woltermann (2002) argues that, in most 
countries, the labour market is segmented into formal and informal 
employment and self-employment. In this model, vacancies in these 
different labour market sectors are promoted via different channels, 
and part of the labour market segmentation originates from a lack of 
information on vacancies in the formal sector. The lack of information 
in the formal sector makes it more rigid, so wages take more time to 




II.  Definition and identification of informality
A.  Definition
Informal employment produces legal goods but it does not comply with 
governmental regulations. This general definition of informality is very 
convenient, for two reasons. The first is that it differentiates the illegal 
sector from informal work, and thus excludes drug dealing, robbery 
and corruption from informal employment. The second reason is that 
it links informal work with governmental regulations and not with a 
particular labour characteristics i.e. firm size, wage, etc.
B.   The data and identification of informal employment
Information about wages in Mexico comes primarily from three 
sources: contractual wages (Ministry of Labour), wages from work-
ers registered in the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS), and 
wages in the manufacturing sector (National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography, INEGI). These wage indicators have two main advantages: 
periodicity and opportunity. However, this information covers only a 
limited part of the Mexican labour market. This portion of the sector 
is generally known as formal employment.
To identify the informal sector, we use the National Survey of Urban 
Employment (ENEU). In this work we use individual level data cover-
ing urban areas. It surveys around 100,000 workers in every Mexican 
state on a quarterly basis collecting information from households. It 
was designed to be representative of urban areas at national level. 
In 1995 the Mexican economy endured a serious crisis in which it 
experienced significant changes in unemployment and wages. This 
variation in time allows us to identify the effects we are interested in. 
It must be mentioned that in the second quarter of 2000, the ENEU was 
replaced with the Quarterly National Survey of Employment (Spanish 
acronym ENE). The ENE also includes rural zones, but started to lose 
cities sequentially since 2002. Therefore, in order to take advantage 
of the volatility produced by the crisis that started at the end of 1994, 
and to avoid losing cities from the sample, the study goes from the 
first quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 2001.122
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This survey has information about workers’ benefits and business reg-
istration status. Therefore, it is possible to identify informal work. Self 
employed workers and employees have different legal requirements. 
While the former are not required by law to be registered to social 
security, employees on the contrary, by law must to be registered to 
the IMSS (Ley Federal del Trabajo art. 20 and 21).
Therefore, in this paper we use two methods to identify informal 
workers. In the case of employees we consider informal workers 
those who do not have either of the following benefits: Social Security 
(IMSS), Public Social Security (ISSSTE), Pensions (AFORE), private 
health care (provided by the employer) or registration to the National 
Institute of House Founding (INFONAVIT). In the case of the self 
employed, workers registered with a local or federal government or in 
a commercial association are considered to be formal. In this way, we 
avoid that self employed workers that are registered and comply with 
governmental regulations to be wrongly considered informal.
This criteria to identify informal workers is different from traditional 
methods. These methods generally link informal labour with people 
working in small firms (usually workers in firms smaller than five 
employees are considered informal). However, a substantial amount 
of unregistered employees work in firms higher than 100 workers5. 
Furthermore, working in a small firm does not guarantee unregistered 
work, many small firms might be registered and pay taxes. Therefore, 
the traditional method to identify informal workers is not very accurate. 
Additionally, considering that the ENEU is held in households and 
not in firms, it is possible that individuals who respond the interview 
have a better knowledge about the type of benefits he or she receives 
and, in case of being self employed, the registration status their busi-
ness may have. Consequently, we consider the that chosen criteria to 
identify informal workers is less prone to error than the criteria based 
on the size of the establishment.
5  If we consider the 2001 ENEU average, about 9% of the unregistered workers belong to 




C.  Variable list
Apart from worker’s age, wage and unemployment rate, all variables 
are dummies. We divided variables in two groups: worker’s character-
istics and work place characteristics. Table 1 shows the variable list.
Table 1.  Variables list.
 Worker characteristics   Work place characteristics 
 Logarithm of real monthly wage   Economic sector: 
age   Farming and Agriculture 
age2: age squared   Mining and Electricity industry 
Marital status:   Manufacturing 
Married   Construction 
Single   Commerce 
Years of schooling:   Communications and Transportation 
Less than 6 years of schooling   Services 
Between 6 -12 years of schooling.   Public Administration and Defense 
More than 12 years of schooling   Firm size: 
Region:   One person 
North   Between 2 and 15 people 
Center   Between 16 and 100 people 
South   More than 100 people 
Relative:   
Head of family   
Partner   
Son   
Gender   
In this study we use the logarithm of the real monthly wage deflacted 
by the National Consumer Price Index (CPI) published by INEGI. We 
estimate the unemployment rate with data from the ENEU using the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) definition of unemployment: 
unemployed people do not have a job, want a job, have actively sought 
work in the last 4 weeks and are available to start working in the next 
2 weeks. Those that have worked at least one hour last week (from 
the day of the interview) and those who are temporarily away from a 
job, e.g. on holiday, are considered to be employed.124
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III.  Methodology
Empirical studies of labour market flexibility have focused on cross-
country flexibility (Bertola, 1990; Lazear, 1990; among others). These 
researchers analyzed the relationship between labour market regula-
tions across countries and employment indicators, e.g. unemployment 
rate and participation level. From the data available in the ENEU, we 
can identify two type of workers (formal and informal) that coexist in 
the same labour market. We can also obtain unemployment and wages 
across Mexican states and time.
First, we study the two sectors separately i.e. how unemployment 
affects wages in the formal and in the informal sector. Second, we 
study the link between formal-informal wage differentials and unem-
ployment.
Given that the main objective of this paper is to study labour market 
flexibility in the formal and the informal sectors, the second estima-
tion may seem redundant. However, wage differentials can be seen as 
a measure of labour market efficiency, higher wage differentials may 
be related to higher distortions. Studying the relationship between 
unemployment and wage differentials in time can help to quantify 
modifications in the labour market distortions when unemployment 
changes, a relevant information for this study.
We analyze the relationship between wages and unemployment across 
two dimensions: regions and time. As explained in Section I, we expect 
informal labour to be more flexible than formal labour.
Heterogeneity between states allows us to capture differences in 
wages and unemployment across regions. States with higher levels 
of labour market regulations enforcement6 may present higher wage 
differentials between formal and informal workers, and a higher level 
of unemployment. Additionally, the dynamic of changes in wages and 
unemployment in time provides more information. For example, during 
a negative shock to the economy, wages in the informal labour may 
6  Mexico is a very heterogeneous country. Labour market regulations may be more difficult 
to enforce in states with higher proportion of people living in isolated regions or with higher 




react downwards swiftly, and unemployment among informal work-
ers will not increase significantly. On the other hand, formal work-
ers may present higher degree of wage rigidities. Therefore, if there 
is a different level of flexibility between formal and informal labour 
during a negative shock to the economy, we can expect a rise in the 
unemployment rate, together with an increment in wage differentials 
between formal and informal workers. That is, a positive relationship 
between wage differentials and unemployment. It is important to un-
derline that there may be other factors that can explain differentials in 
labour market flexibility. For instance, a negative shock to the economy 
might reduce the demand for labour in the construction sector while 
leaving the demand of labour in the government sector unchanged. 
Since there is higher incidence of informal labour in the construction 
sector, the informal wage will fall more than the formal wage, even if 
the government sector is perfectly flexible. However, given that sectors 
with higher proportion of informal workers tend to be more flexible, 
we consider that this issue is not too worrisome.
This study presents the following main challenges. First, the selec-
tion between formal and informal workers may not be random and, 
second, the possible correlation between shocks in wages and shocks 
in unemployment.
The first problem can cause formal - informal flexibility differentials 
to be the result of differences in workers’ characteristics, and not of 
differences in regulations or in workers’ effort observability between 
formal and informal labour. To deal with this issue, we control for 
workers’ observable characteristics. Fortunately, the ENEU uses a 
wide range of questions that can give us a good idea of each workers’ 
observable characteristics. Diverse regions may have different labour 
market structures, and panel data allows us to control for fixed regional 
specific effects, no matter whether they are observed or not. We can 
also control for sample selection.126
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Figure 1.  Endogeneity of the unemployment rate.
The second problem generates endogeneity of the unemployment 
rate. It is worth analyzing carefully the effect of the endogeneity of 
the unemployment rate on the estimations. This problem may arise if 
there are unobserved factors that affect the unemployment rate and 
wages at the same time. The sign of the bias due endogeneity of the 
unemployment is not clear; however we ilustrate a particular example 
of negative bias:
In the case of an economic crisis, the demand for labour shifts form 
D0 to D1 (Figure 1). If the supply of labour does not change, the new 
equilibrium point is c. Hence, we have a negative relationship between 
wage and unemployment.
However it may happen that the economic crisis also affects the sup-
ply of labour, shifting the curve from S0 to S1. In this case, the new 
equilibrium point is b. In the new equilibrium we still have a negative 
relationship between wage and unemployment, but no so strong. In this 
case, if we do not control for the endogeneity of the unemployment 
rate, the results will be negatively biased.
We estimate the relationship between unemployment and wages under 




to check for robustness and to obtain a better understanding of the 
problem. In all the regressions, we include time dummy variables.
In order to obtain the wage differentials we do one regression per state 
per quarter, we have 28 quarters (from 1995 to 2001) and 327 states, 
thus we have 881 observations. We obtain wage differentials in three 
different ways:
 
1.  Raw differentials
2.  Controling for observable differences
3.  Controling for observable differences and sample selection 
We then use the data obtained above to analyze the relationship between 
wage differentials and unemployment with two panel data models.
 
1.  Fixed effect model
2.  Dynamic Model, Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) 
We now describe in detail how we estimate wages and wage differ-
entials.
IV.   Estimating wages
A.   Raw wages
1.   Wages
We obtain the average of the formal and informal raw wages by state 
and time, denoted  LogWst
Fr aw
,
,  and  LogWst
Ir aw
,
,  respectively, where t is 
quarter and s is the state where the worker is based. We get 881 ob-
servations for each sector wage.
7  Quintana Roo y Baja California Sur were incorporated to the ENEU in the first quarter of 
1996. Hidalgo was incorporated in the fourth quarter of 1996. After the fourth quarter of 
1996, the sample of states is complete.128
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2.   Wage differentials
To obtain raw differentials, we regress the following equation for each 
worker i.
  LogW Formal ists ts ti st ist ,, ,, ,, ,, = ab e ++    (1)
where Formal is 1 if the worker is formal or 0 otherwise. LogW is the 
logarithm of the real monthly wage. bs,t represents the difference in 
wage associated with the fact of being formal. We can obtain the wage 
differentials setting draw s,t = bs,t (a regression for each quarter (t) and 
each state (s), from each regression we obtain one b). Therefore we 
obtain 881 observations of draws,t .
B.   Controlling for observable characteristics
1.   Wages
In order to control for observable characteristics, we run a wage re-
gression with personal worker characteristics, and those linked with 
work-related characteristics as independent variables separately, for 
formal and informal workers:
Then we obtain the average of the estimated wages by state and quarter. 
That is, 881 observations of each   and  . 
2.   Wage differentials
To control for observable characteristics, we add to equation 1 work-
ers’ observable characteristics. We then run the following regression 
for all workers:
We set bs,t = dconts,t and we obtain 881 observations of dconts,t. The 




workers’ characteristics. It is important to underline that controlling 
for observable characteristics does not eliminate all individual specific 
differences that determine wage differentials. Two individuals with 
the same observable characteristics in the same sector may still have 
different wages because they may have different abilities.
C.   Controlling for observable characteristics and sample 
selection
The former specification had a potential problem of sample selection. 
When we split the sample into two sub-samples (formal and informal 
workers) the new sub-samples may not be random. If some workers’ 
characteristics affect the workers’ probability of being formal (or 
informal), the process that determines which worker is formal and 
which is informal (treatment) is not random, and the OLS regression 
will be biased.
A solution to this problem was proposed by Heckman (1979), who 
used a system of simultaneous equations with Mills’ ratio as a new 
variable to solve the problem.
Heckman (1979) proposed to estimate equation with a simultaneous 
equation system in two stages. The first stage of the procedure is to 
estimate the probability of being formal in order to obtain the inverse 
Mills ratio, the second stage is estimate the wage equation adding the 
inverse Mills ratio as independent variable.
As seen in Heckman (1979), to set up the model correctly we need 
variables that affect the probability of being formal but do not affect 
wages. The chosen variable is the position the worker has in his fam-
ily. We assume that being head of the family does not affect wages 
conditioned on its status (i.e. being formal or informal). In other words, 
we assume that being head of the family affects the probability of be-
ing formal but does not affect the workers’ wage8. Therefore, the first 
stage equation contains all independent variables of Table 1 except the 
8  Labour rights like social security can be passed to partner or sons. Therefore, head of the 
familiy may have more insetives to be formal. 130
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variable relative. The potential problem in this identifying assumption 
is that we can not be certain this assumption is totally correct.
In order to estimate formal and informal wages and wage differentials 
controlling for workers observable characteristics and sample selection, 
we run the following regressions (first stage is omitted):
     (2)
     (3)
If the ost
F
,  is significant there is a problem of sample selection an this 
model corrects for it.
After doing the regressions on the model for all the states, we finally 
obtain 881 estimated wages,   and  , and wage dif-
ferentials:
  .
D.  Relationship between wage and unemployment
We deal with cross-sectional and time series data. A common speci-
fication problem when working with longitudinal data is unobserved 
heterogeneity across groups of the sample.
There are two main models of panel data that deal with unobserved 
heterogeneity: fixed effect and random effect.
In order to estimate models with unobserved heterogeneity, it is nec-
essary to make some assumptions about the heterogeneity behavior. 
There are two main assumptions that fundament two panel data models 
(Greene, 2003):
 
1.  The unobserved heterogeneity does not change in time and it is 
correlated with the independent variables (fixed effect model).
2.  The unobserved heterogeneity is not correlated with the right hand 




We consider that workers and firm characteristics can be correlated 
with regional unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, we consider that 
the fixed effects model is suitable to estimate the relationship between 
unemployment and differentials between formal and informal wages 
across regions.
Thus, we estimate the following equation:
  WU D st st st = ba e ++    (4)
Where D is a ST ´ S matrix (S total number of states and T is total 
number of periods) formed by di , dummy variables indicating the sth 
state, D = [d1d2d3...dS], Ust is unemployment and Wst is wage in state 
s and time t.
V.    Results
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of the unemployment rate 
coefficient (b) of equation (4) using six different dependent variables 







, , wages estimated controlling for observable character-
istics:   and  ; and wages estimated controlling for 
observable characteristics and sample selection:   and  . 
In Table 3 we show the results of the same estimation as above but using 
wage differentials as dependent variables: raw differentials (draws,t), 
controlling for observable characteristics (dconts,t) and controlling for 
observable characteristics and sample selection (dsels,t).
First we describe Table 2. Raw wages regressions do not show a 
significant effect of unemployment on wages in the formal nor in the 
informal sector. However, once we control for observable character-
istics, both formal and informal sectors show evidence of a negative 
correlation between unemployment and wages. Under this specifica-
tion, the coefficient of unemployment in the formal sector is –1.90 
and in the informal sector is –2.25. Yet, we can not reject H0 that both 
coefficients are different to each other. This would suggest that there 
is no difference of flexibility between the formal and informal sector. 
However, when we control for observable characteristics and sample 
selection (bottom two rows of the Table), an interesting result arises. 132
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In the formal sector we did not find that unemployment statistically 
affects wages. On the other hand, we find a strong negative relationship 
between unemployment and wages in the informal sector.
Table 2.   Estimation of the coefficient of unemployment.
 Dependent variables   Coefficient   Std. error  t p > | t |











Estimated wages controlling 











 Estimated wages controlling 











Independent variable: unemployment 
Number of observations: 881 
Number of groups: 32
We now describe Table 3. The first row corresponds to raw wage dif-
ferentials. The coefficient of unemployment is 2.036 and is significant 
at 95% confidence level. This contrasts with the results of raw wages 
described in Table 2 that showed a non-significant effect of unem-
ployment on wages in both formal and informal sector: This result 
emphasizes the relevance of studying the effect of unemployment on 
both wage differentials and wages. When we control for observable 
characteristics, the coefficient of unemployment falls to 0.356 but is 
still significant at 10% level. If we control for observable characteristics 
and sample selection, the coefficient of unemployment rises to 5.299 
an is found to be significant at 1% level. These results show evidence 
that the informal labour market is more flexible than the formal and 
that distortions of the Mexican labour market (measured as wage 
differentials obtained after controlling for observable characteristics 
and sample selection) increase during volatile times, i.e. economic 
crises. However, these results may be biased due to the endogeneity 
of the unemployment rate. In the following section we describe the 
problem and propose an estimation that may contribute to overcome 
this problem.
As explained before, in order to estimate wages we estimate formal 
and informal wage equations for each quarter and state during the 
study period. Therefore, we obtained a coefficient associated to the 




regressions made to estimate wages, the coefficient os,t was significant 
in almost 85% of cases. Thus, sample selection between formal and 
informal workers seems to be a significant issue across states and time, 
we consider then this as the best specification to estimate wages.
Table 3.   Estimation of the coefficient of unemployment.
 Dependent variables   Coefficient   Std. error  t  p > | t |
 Raw differentials (draw)   2.037   0.259   7.81   0.000 
 Controlling for observable characteristics 
(dcont) 
 0.356   0.198   1.80   0.073 
 Controlling for sample selection (dsel)   5.299   0.838   6.32   0.000 
Independent variable: unemployment 
Number of observations: 881 
Number of groups: 32
VI.   Endogeneity of unemployment rate
A possible problem in the former specifications is the endogeneity of 
the unemployment rate.
Consider the regression:
     (5)
Where Wst is wage in state s and time t and Ust is the unemployment 
rate. One of the assumptions of the classical regression model is the 
exogeneity of the independent variables:
EU st st [| ]=0. e
However, this condition may not hold in this estimation. For example, 
in the case of negative shock to the economy, the same shock affects 
the level of employment and wages, subsequently:
  CovU st st (, )0 , e ≠    (6)
therefore
EU st st [| ]0 . e ≠134
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Hence one of the assumptions of OLS (exogeneity of the independent 
variables) is not valid.
We can solve this problem using an Instrumental Variables (IV) pro-
cedure. In order to be valid, the set of instrumental variables should be 
directly related to Ust , but should be uncorrelated (other than indirectly, 
through their effect on unemployment) with wages (Wst ).
The dynamic of unemployment implies that if an economy receives 
an exogenous shock in t –1, then the level of unemployment in t will 
be affected
  UUu st st st ,, 1, =, 0.  − +≠    (7)
Therefore a possible IV variable is the lag of the unemployment rate
Cov(est ,ut) ¹ 0 but Cov(est ,ut – 1) = 0.
Hence we can estimate the following equation:
 
However, even if Cov(est ,ut – 1) = 0, Us,t can still be correlated with Us,t –2. 
If this is the case we still have an endogeneity problem, but now with 
the lag of the dependent variable.
A solution to this problem was proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
Equation 5 can be estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation in differences with lags of the independent variable. 
This estimation takes full advantage of the orthogonality conditions of 
the lags in levels of the dependent variable and lags of the endogenous 
independent variable (Us,t in this case) and allows for overidentifica-
tion test that verifies the validity of the orthogonality conditions. In 
order to estimate the parameters of interest, GMM models require the 
specification of some moment conditions.
Another advantage of this specification is that, because it includes lags 




about the speed of adjustment of the labour market. Now we briefly 
describe the Arellano-Bond 1991 model:
     (8)
On the right hand side, we have now a lag of the dependent variable. 
The term as is the state-specific fixed effect. The lag of the dependent 
variable is correlated with the disturbance. Therefore, simple fixed or 
random effects estimator is biased on finite samples and its variance 
does not tends to zero, as the number of observation increases.
Fixed effects can be taken out of the model if we obtain first diffe-
rences:
  WW WW UU st st st st it it it it −− +−+− −− −− − 11 2, 1, 1 =( )( )( ). b ee    (9)
Without group effects, we can use instrumental variables estimators; 
we use different lags of the dependent variable as instruments. Arellano 
and Bond (1991) showed that there is more information in the sample 
that can be used with a GMM estimator. As we saw above, we know 
that the unemployment (Uit ) is endogenous.
Sargan Test An important issue in GMM models is the validity of the 
orthogonality conditions. In order to test the orthogonality restrictions 
Arellano and Bond (1991), proposed a Sargan (1958) overidentifica-
tion test.
If the model is correctly specified, the mean of the sum of all moment 
conditions evaluated in   should be close to zero.
Therefore, the Sargan test allows us to verify the validity of these new 
instrumental variables. Thus, the Arellano and Bond model allows us 
to estimate   consistently, even if
 
•   eit are serially correlated and
•   CovX it it (, )0 12 e ≠  for all t1 ≠ t2.136
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A.  Discussion
Since the best specification to estimate wages is controlling for ob-
servable characteristics and sample selection, we decide to present 
Arellano Bond results using this specification9. In Tables 4 and 5 we 
estimate equation 9 for different measures of wages.
As seen in Arellano and Bond (1991), the autocovariance of the residu-
als of order 1 need not to be zero. The results of the Arellano-Bond 
test show that there exists first order serial correlation. However, the 
consistency of the GMM estimators depends heavily on the assump-
tion that the autocovariance in the residuals of order 2 is equal to 
zero. All regressions presented in this section comply with these two 
conditions.
Table 4 summarizes the results estimated separately for formal and 
informal workers. Both regressions contain two lags of the depend-
ent variable. These results are consistent with previous results. In the 
formal sector there is no evidence that unemployment affects wages. 
On the other hand, in the informal sector, unemployment negatively 
affects wages at 99% confidence level. The elasticity of wages in the 
informal sector to changes in unemployment is -2.8. Other interesting 
result arises if we compare the coefficient of the lags of the dependent 
variable. In the formal sector, the coefficient of the first lag is 0.148 
and the coefficient of the second lag is 0.105. When looking at the 
standard error of each coefficient we see that these are not statistically 
different from each other. In contrast, in the informal sector regres-
sion, the coefficient of the first lag of wage is almost three times the 
coefficient of the second lag. This could be evidence that wages in the 
informal sector adjust quicker to shocks to the economy. 
The results of Table 5 (wage differentials) show that after controlling 
for the endogeneity of the unemployment rate and workers’ observable 
characteristics, wage differentials increase when the unemployment 
rate increases. Indeed, the coefficient of unemployment is positive 
(2.412) and represents the elasticity of wage differentials with 
respect to changes in unemployment. The importance of this finding 
9  Result tables of Arellano Bond models using other methods to estimate wages (controling 




becomes evident when interpreting these results. An increase of 10% in 
the unemployment rate implies a 24% increase in the wage differential 
between formal and informal employment. It is important to remember 
that these wage differentials are estimated after controlling for workers’ 
observable characteristics and for regional non observed effects. In this 
context, formal-informal wage differentials can be viewed as a form of 
labour market distortion10. Therefore, important changes in unemployment 
(observed during economic crises) can increase formal-informal wage 
differentials and, as a result, rise the distortions of the labour market.
Another result that is worth to underline is that taking into account the 
dynamic of the wage differentials in time is important. The coefficients 
of the first and second lag of the wage differentials are significant at 
99% of confidence. That is, shocks on the economy have decreasing 
effects on wage differentials between formal and informal workers 
that last six months.
There are obvious advantages in having a flexible labour market: For 
example, if a flexible labour market receives a negative demand shock, 
wages will decrease but unemployment will suffer little change, thus 
spreading the cost of the crisis among the majority of the workers. 
Flexible labour markets are characterized by being more competitive 
10  If all formal-informal wage differentials are explained by non pecuniary benefits of informal 
work, formal-informal wage differentials should not be sensible to changes in unemployment.
Table 4.  Controling for serial autocorrelation.
 Indep. var.   Coef.   Std. err.   z   p > | z |   Indep. var.   Coef.   Std. err.  z  p > | z |   
Constant   -0.014   0.006  -2.25   0.025  Constant    -0.175   0.011  -1.55   0.121 
Wformal (t – 1)  0.148   0.040   3.70   0.000  Winformal (t – 1)    0.232   0.038  6.04   0.000 
Wformal (t – 2)    0.105   0.038   2.76   0.006  Winformal (t – 2)    0.081   0.037  2.19   0.028 
Uv  -0.510   0.535  -0.95   0.340   Uv    -2.786   0.947  -2.94   0.003 
Dependent variable: Wformal    Dependent variable: Winformal 
Dep. var. are estimated by controlling for workers observable characteristics and sample selection. 
Number of observations: 785 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (Ho: ortogonality conditions are not valid): 
chi2(348) = 405.48 Prob > chi2 = 0.018   chi2(348) = 382.98 Prob > chi2 = 0.0710 
A-Bond test that average autocovar. in res. of order 1 is 0 
Ho: no autocorr. z = 20.72 Pr > z = 0.000   Ho: no autocorr. z = –18.85 Pr > z = 0.000 
A-Bond test that average autocovar. in res. of order 2 is 0 
Ho: no autocorr. z = –0.48 Pr > z = 0.6317   Ho: no autocorr. z = –1.28 Pr > z = 0.200 138
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and more productive. This also implies an economy that is better able 
to adapt to the changing economic environment.
Table 5.   Controling for serial autocorrelation.
 Variables   Coefficient   Std. error  z p > | z | 
 Constant  0.009   0.012   0.74   0.457 
dsel(t–1)  0.193   0.040   4.81   0.000 
dsel(t–2)  0.029   0.037   0.79   0.432 
Uv  2.412   1.140   2.12   0.034 
 Dependent variable: dsel
 Number of observations: 785 
 Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions: 
 Ho: ortogonality conditions are not valid 
 chi2(312) = 348.27 Prob > chi2 = 0.077 
 A-Bond test that average autocovar. in res. of order 1 is 0 
 Ho: no autocorrelation z = –17.54 Pr > z = 0.000 
 A-Bond test that average autocovar. in res. of order 2 is 0 
 Ho: no autocorrelation z = –0.66 Pr > z = 0.510 
Note: The default number of lags of the dependent variable to be used as instruments is T–p–2 
where T is the number of quarters, p is the number of parameters. In this case the default number 
of lags of the dependent variable to be used as instrument is 26. However, in order to improve 
the specification of this model we limit this number to 18.
These findings show evidence of the existence of differentiated flex-
ibilities between formal and informal employment. As we saw in sec-
tion I, there is more than one possible explanation for this situation: 
(bad) formal labour market regulations11, differences in workers’ effort 
observability, or differences in search frictions between formal and 
informal employment. All of these can explain differences in labour 
flexibility between formal and informal employment. In this study 
we cannot formally differentiate the effect from these three factors. 
However, these results offer a hint of which of these three factors may 
be more predominant. Indeed, the last two arguments can explain dif-
ferent formal-informal labour market flexibilities but cannot explain 
zero flexibility in one sector. In this study, zero flexibility would be 
11  The identification of the labour market regulations affecting the flexibility of the formal 
sector is beyond the scope of this work. It is clearly important (for welfare as well as ef-
ficiency reasons) to support workers during unemployment periods. However, the current 
Mexican firing indemnification system seems to hamper formal labour market flexibility. 
This system could be changed for a less distortionary indemnification system like the Chil-
ean unemployment insurance, “Seguro de Cesanta” (Acevedo, Eskenazi, and Pagés, 2006). 
Under this system, workers, government and employers contribute to an individualized 
workers account. If fired, the worker can use this account to finance his/her unemployment 




a non-significant effect of unemployment on wages. Given that a 
significant statistical effect of unemployment on wages in the formal 
sector was not found, we can argue that the regulatory framework of 
the Mexican labour market may be a relevant issue in Mexico and that 
changes in the Mexican labour law can contribute to improve labour 
market flexibility.
Another important result of this study is that, if we consider formal-
informal wage differentials as an indicator of labour market distortion, 
during volatile times (observed mainly during crises) the labour market 
distortion in Mexico increases, hampering the ability of the Mexican 
economy to recover.
VII. Conclusions
We showed that there are differences in labour market flexibility be-
tween the formal and the informal labour markets. On one hand, we 
could not find evidence that unemployment affects wages in the formal 
sector. On the other hand, we found a significant negative effect of 
unemployment on wages in the informal sector. Additionally, we found 
evidence that, controlling for observable workers’ characteristics and 
unobservable regional effects, an increase of 10% the unemployment 
rate rises formal-informal real wage differentials by 24%.
The ENEU allowed us to analyze this relationship in two dimensions, 
across time and across regions. This permitted us to capture the infor-
mation available in the heterogeneity between different Mexican states 
and differences in time. It also allowed us to use a more sophisticated 
econometric model for panel data analysis.
We started by estimating the link between unemployment and wages, 
using raw wage differentials. We then controlled for observable 
workers’ characteristics, sample selection, non observable regional 
heterogeneity and endogeneity of unemployment. We found evidence 
that wages in the informal sector are more sensitive to changes in un-
employment. Given unemployment endogeneity, the best specification 
to test wages; sensitivity to changes in unemployment is GMM in a 
dynamic panel data.140
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The findings of this paper are relevant for three reasons:
•  First, because of the importance of having flexible labour markets.
  It is important to underline that in this study we do not formally 
look at the reasons why the informal sector is more flexible than 
the formal one, however, the results can give us a general idea of 
what it may be happening. As we saw before, differences in labour 
market flexibility can be explained by at least three factors: labour 
market regulations, differences in search frictions and differences 
in workers’ observable characteristics between the two types of 
labour. Each of these explanations implies different measures to 
increase labour market flexibility. However, the last two theories 
cannot explain zero labour market flexibility in the formal sector. 
Considering that we couldn’t find a significant effect of unemploy-
ment on wages in the formal sector, the regulatory problem seems 
to be important in this context. As a result, changes in the Labour 
Federal Law and in local regulations can contribute to improve 
the flexibility of the Mexican labour market. However, we cannot 
underestimate the other explanations of poor formal labour market 
flexibility. If the problem is explained by differences in search fric-
tions between formal and informal labour, a campaign focused on 
improving the information available to agents in the labour market 
can decrease the difference in labour market flexibility between 
informal and formal labour. Finally, if the differences in labour 
market flexibility are explained by differences in effort observa-
bility, measures to improve flexibility in the formal sector may 
be more difficult to implement, because the differences originate 
from the need to encourage workers with low effort observability 
to work harder; in other words, it would be in the nature of formal 
labour.
  It may be that a combination of the factors described above explains 
the differences in flexibility between the two types of labour.
•  Second, these results are important because they shed light on the 




that during volatile periods, formal-informal wage differences 
increase as a consequence of changes in unemployment. If we 
consider wage differentials as a form of labour market distortion, 
periods of crises rise the distortion in the Mexican economy and, 
as a result, further obstruct the ability of the labour market to adapt 
to the new circumstances and delay the recovering of the Mexican 
economy. This is particularly relevant in the current international 
economic situation. Since the last quarter of 2008, Mexico and 
other countries are facing an unprecedented economic crisis where 
GDP and unemployment are expected to show a deep contraction 
during 2009. These results cast doubt about the capability of the 
Mexican labour market to quickly adapt to these new circumstances 
and start recovering.
•  Third, wages are an important component of the inflationary pro-
cess in all economies. Inflation is a serious concern in developing 
countries, and therefore, Central Banks need to follow wages 
closely in order to anticipate an increment in prices. Even though 
data and indicators from formal employment are important because 
of their precision and periodicity, it is important to remember that 
they do not cover the totality of the labour market. Thus, labour 
market research cannot rely exclusively on data and indicators from 
formal sectors, especially in countries with a significant amount 
of informal employment, such as Mexico.
The next step in this line of research may be to formally identify the 
sources of the differences in the labour flexibility between formal and 
informal workers, with the aim of implementing efficient measures to 
improve the flexibility of the labour market as a whole. Although it 
lies outside the scope of this analysis, improving the flexibility of the 
formal labour market could increase the attractiveness of formal labour, 
and therefore lead to an increase in the proportion of formal workers in 
the economy. This could bring some benefits to the economy such as 
an increment on the benefits related with formal jobs: i.e., an increased 
number of workers with access to social security, access to financial 
markets and rise government tax revenues, among others.142
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